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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are:
1.

Chris Ann Williams ("Mellor"), as guardian of Hay den Williams (deceased
minor); and

2.

Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance and Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
(collectively "Wasatch Crest."

3.

While not named as parties in this matter, Utah Life & Health Insurance Guaranty
Association ("ULHIGA") and the Liquidator for Wasatch Crest ("Liquidator") are
integrally involved in the matter.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann §78A-3-102(3)G) and Utah R.
App. P. 4(a). Judge Toomey entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying
Plaintiff Chris Ann Mellor's ("Mellor") Motion for Summary Judgment and granting the
Defendants' Motion to Stay on November 1, 2010. Mellor filed her Notice of Appeal on
December 1, 2010.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE:

The Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act ("the Act"), U.C.A. §31A-

27-301 et seq., provides class three distribution priority for losses incurred by insureds
and federal and state governments. Mellor and the Utah Office of Recovery Services
("ORS") asserted claims for medical expenses against Wasatch Crest in liquidation but
the Liquidator ruled that those claims had class six distribution priority because they were
not classified elsewhere in the statute. Does the class three language include the claims
ofMellorandORS?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
The following is central to Mellor's appeal:
•

U.C.A.§31A-27-301ef^.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case brought for recovery of wrongfully denied health insurance benefits

which should have been provided for Hayden under a group health benefits plan
4

sponsored by his father's employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. The insurer for that employersponsored plan, Wasatch Crest, terminated Hay den's coverage after he became eligible
for coverage from Utah State Medicaid following his catastrophic drowning accident in
2001 and denied coverage for Hayden's medical expenses. Wasatch Crest subsequently
was declared insolvent and ongoing administration was appointed to the Liquidator.
Hayden's benefit claim made its way through the district court and the first
Supreme Court decision ("Initial Decision") held that Wasatch Crest was required to
provide COBRA continuation coverage for up to 36 months after Hayden's initial
qualifying event and that his eligibility for Medicaid did not relieve Wasatch Crest of the
obligation to provide that coverage . The Initial Decision further held that Mellor, as
Hayden's guardian, had standing to pursue the claim against Wasatch Crest for its
wrongful denial of coverage for Hayden's medical expenses. Following the Initial
Decision and after a year of inaction by the Liquidator, Mellor requested the district
court's ruling on the priority of the claim. Mellor asserted that the claim had a class three
distribution priority because it was a claim for health benefits by an insured for which
Wasatch Crest had wrongfully denied payment.
The district court erred in accepting the Liquidator's argument that Mellor's claim
was not properly included as a class three distribution priority claim but fell under lower
priority class six claims. Mellor seeks this Court's order that the claim, based on her own
standing and her existing Collection Agreement with ORS, is properly included in class
three distribution priority rather than class six.
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential facts in the case are undisputed and the trial court's Order consisted
of conclusions of law based on those undisputed facts. Those facts are:
1.

Justin Williams ("Williams") was employed by Mellor Engineering and was a
participant in the group health benefits plan ("the Plan") provided by Mellor
Engineering for its employees. Record, vol. 12, p. 5049.

2.

Williams also elected coverage under the Plan for his wife and children. Id.

3.

Williams' employment with Mellor Engineering terminated as of August,
2000. Id.

4.

Williams elected COBRA continuation coverage for himself and his family
after his employment ended. Id.

5.

Williams and Mellor were divorced in March of 2001. Id.

6.

Hayden's COBRA continuation coverage continued under the Plan following
the divorce of his parents. Id.

7.

Hayden's coverage under the Plan was in place on the date of his drowning
accident, August 4, 2001. Id.

8.

Hayden's health care providers submitted claims for payment of his medical
expenses after the accident and the Plan paid claims on behalf of Hay den. Id.

9.

Following the accident, Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den and
the application was granted retroactive to August 1, 2001. Id.
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10.

Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den because she anticipated the
possibility that the Plan would not provide coverage for all of Hay den's
expenses. Record, vol. 12, p. 5189.

11.

In addition, Mellor knew that Hay den's COBRA benefit would not continue
indefinitely and that when it ended, she would need Medicaid assistance to pay
Hay den's medical expenses. Id.

12.

The Plan terminated Hay den's coverage as of August 1, 2001, and requested
reimbursement of amounts already paid to Hay den's health care providers.
Record, vol. 12, 5049.

13.

In August, September and October of 2001, premiums continued to be paid for
COBRA continuation coverage for Hayden through the Plan. Record, vol. 9,
p. 3577.

14.

Some time beginning in November of 2001, the Plan, through its
reimbursement specialist, AGA, invoked an exclusion in the Wasatch Crest
policy, asserting that Wasatch Crest had no obligation to pay for any of
Hayden's medical expenses associated with the accident because there was no
coverage under the policy for Hayden at any time after August 1, 2001, the
date he became eligible for coverage from Medicaid. Record, vol. 9, p. 3741.

15.

Wasatch Crest through AGA, collected reimbursement from healthcare
providers that it had previously paid for services provided to Hayden including
$5,987.47 from South Davis Community Hospital and $23,809 from Primary
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Children's Hospital, and denied any obligation to cover any medical expenses
that remained unpaid by the Plan. Record vol. 9, pp. 3741, 3900-04, and 3920.
16.

The expenses incurred by Hay den for his medical care from the accident were
extensive. The total amount paid by Medicaid paid for Hay den's medical care
through October 31, 2003 was $184,670.06. Record, vol. 11, p. 4607.

17.

Mellor stopped paying Hayden's COBRA premium in November, 2001, based
on the Defendants' assertion that he was no longer eligible for coverage.
Record, vol. 12, p. 5190.

18.

If Mellor had known that Hay den was, in fact, eligible to continue with
COBRA benefits until July 31, 2003, she would have continued to pay his
COBRA premiums. Id.

19.

Throughout the time frame at issue - from August 1, 2001 through July 31,
2003, Hayden's medical expenses were submitted to, and paid by, Medicaid.
Record, vol. 12, p. 5192.

20.

The total amount of claims paid by Medicaid during the time frame when
Hay den should have had COBRA continuation coverage, from August 1, 2001
through July 31, 2003, is $181,357.51. Id.

21.

In 2002, ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Mellor which
authorized inclusion of ORS's claims for reimbursement with Mellor's claims
against Wasatch Crest. Record, vol. 12, 5049.

22.

AGa communicated with ORS, the Utah state agency charged with recovering
reimbursement of Medicaid funds, in August and September of 2002, about
8

whether Wasatch Crest was responsible to pay Hayden's medical expenses.
Record, vol. 9, p. 3928.
23.

In response to ORS's claim, AGA asserted that the claims had been properly
denied and that Wasatch Crest was not obligated to reimburse Medicaid. Id.

24.

On September 25, 2002, ORS entered into a collection agreement with
Mellor's prior counsel, Robert Schumacher, in which ORS authorized Mellor
and her counsel to represent the interests of Medicaid, as well as Mellor's and
Hayden's, in pursuing payment of the denied medical expenses arising out of
Hayden's accident from Wasatch Crest. Record, vol. 11, pp. 4641-4647.

25.

On March 10, 2003, Mellor filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Utah County against Wasatch Crest for its " . . . unlawful denial of coverage on
medical and health care expenses . . . " arising out of Hayden's accident.
Record, vol. 10, p. 3959.

26.

On July 11,2003, Wasatch Crest was declared insolvent and proceedings were
initiated in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County for its
liquidation. Record, vol. 10, p. 3959.

27.

On November 5, 2003, Mellor filed a claim in the Wasatch Crest liquidation
proceeding on behalf of Hay den for payment of his medical expenses. Mellor
included information in that Notice to indicate that ORS had a lien on the
claim. Record, vol. 13, p. 5583.
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28.

In December of 2003, Mellor's attorney wrote to the Liquidator and attached
an updated ORS lien to supplement Mellor's November 5, 2003 Notice of
Claim. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5602-5603.

29.

On September 6, 2006, counsel for ORS, Stephanie Saperstein, submitted a
Notice of Representation of Medicaid Claim to the district court to further
establish the agreement between ORS and Mellor. Record, vol. 13, pp. 56285634.

30.

On August 6, 2007, the district court entered an Order Approving Referee's
Findings of Fact and Recommendation Regarding Claim No. 300087 - Chris
Ann Williams (Mellor); and Denying Motions of Liquidator and ULHIGA
Regarding Claimant's Standing. Record, vol. 12, pp. 4939 - 4942.

31.

All parties appealed and after briefing their various arguments and presenting
oral argument before the Supreme Court of Utah, the Supreme Court entered
its Initial Decision on January 8, 2009. Record, vol. 12, pp. 5048 - 5056.

32.

The Initial Decision held that Hay den was an insured under the Wasatch Crest
insurance policy at the time of his accident and during the time frame at issue
in the case and that Mellor had standing to pursue the claim. Record, vol. 12,
pp. 5055.

33.

The matter was remitted to the district court on February 20, 2009. Record,
vol. 12, pp. 5075-5076.
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34.

After Mellor's attempts to resolve the claim with the Liquidator were
unsuccessful, she filed her Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
in Support on January 21, 2010. Record, vol. 12, pp. 5141 - 5187.

35.

Concurrently with her Motion and Memorandum, Mellor prepared and
submitted her own Affidavit and the Affidavit of Carrie Worthen. Record, vol.
12, pp. 5188 - 5190 and pp. 5191 - 5325 respectively.

36.

Early in 2010, Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator began distribution and
payment of various class two and class three claims. Mellor received no
notification of any payments by Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator. See, e g.,
Record, vol. 12, pp. 5326 - 5327.

37.

The Liquidator periodically submitted reports on the status of the liquidation to
the district court. A Report on Status of Liquidation Estate for Period Ending
December 31, 2009 was submitted on February 16, 2010. Record, vol. 12, pp.
5333-5337.

38.

The Liquidator referred in his report to the Initial Decision and Mellor's
recently filed Motion for Summary Judgment. The report stated that the Initial
Decision had " . . . found in favor of the claimant on a narrow issue not
necessarily dispositive of the case." Record, vol. 12, p. 5335.

39.

Wasatch Crest filed its Memorandum in Support of (1) Liquidator's Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, (2) Motion to Stay Claimant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, (3) Memorandum in Opposition to
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Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment on April 27, 2010. Record, vol. 13,
pp. 5564-5603.
40.

Wasatch Crest continued to argue that Mellor lacked standing and the real
party in interest was Medicaid. Record, vol. 13, p. 5567.

41.

Wasatch Crest also argued that because Medicaid had provided payment for
Hay den's medical expenses, Mellor's claim, at best, was a class six claim
rather than a claim for coverage of an insured under the policy which would be
classified as a class three claim. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5577 - 5579.

42.

Mellor filed her Consolidated Response Memorandum in Support of her
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss on Jun 1, 2010. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5615 - 5634.

43.

Wasatch Crest filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of its various Motions
on June 29, 2010. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5641 - 5653.

44.

Wasatch Crest argued that Utah statute prohibited equitable restoration of
Mellor's claim from a class six to a class three claim. Record, vol. 13, pp.
5647 - 5649.

45.

Wasatch Crest attached as Exhibit A to its Reply Memo a "Second Amended
Notice of Determination to Claimant" ("2nd Notice") dated June 29, 2010.
Record, vol. 13, p. 5653.

46.

The 2nQ Notice was prepared and provided as an exhibit to Wasatch Crest's
Reply Memo and was never formally served on Mellor or her counsel at a
notification of a decision by the Liquidator. Id.
12

47.

Oral argument was held on August 31, 2010. Record, vol. 13, p. 5689.

48.

The Court issued its Memorandum and Order on November 1, 2010 ("11/1/10
Order"), granting Wasatch Crest's Motion to Stay and denying Mellor's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5702 - 5709.

49.

The 11/1/10 Order agreed with Wasatch Crest that Mellor's claim was a class
six claim because Mellor's claim fell outside the scope of class three status.
Record, vol. 13, p. 5708.

50.

Mellor filed her Notice of Appeal on December 1, 2010, Record, vol. 13, pp.
5714-5715.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Initial Decision is clear and unambiguous in holding that Hay den was a

beneficiary of the Wasatch Crest insurance policy and that Mellor has standing both for
herself and ORS, to pursue reimbursement of Hay den's claim from Wasatch Crest. The
district court's 11/1/10 Order errs because Mellor's claim is for losses incurred under
Hay den's health insurance policy with Wasatch Crest. Whether those claims are asserted
by Mellor on her own behalf or on behalf of ORS, they should be treated as class three
rather than class six priority claims.
ARGUMENT
Mellor's Claims Fall Within Class Three Distribution Priority Under the Act
The Liquidator claims that because Medicaid relieved Mellor of the financial
responsibilities associated with Hay den's medical treatment, Mellor's claims for payment
under the policy are transmogrified from class three to class six claims. The Liquidator is
13

wrong. Class three claims are:
(i)

. . . all claims under policies for losses incurred including:
(A)

Claims of the federal, state, or local government;

(B)Third party claims;...
(ii)

All claims under life and health insurance and annuity policies shall be
treated as loss claims.

(iii)

That portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other
benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not
included in this class, other than benefits or advantages recovered or
recoverable in discharge of familial obligations of support, by way of
succession at death, as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities . . .
(emphasis added)

U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c). Class six claims are:
(A) Any person, including claims of state or local governments, except
those specifically classified elsewhere in this section;... (emphasis
added)
U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(f).
The claims presented by Mellor in her Proof of Claim dated November 5, 2003,
and in her "Supplemental Exhibit" to her proof of claim dated December 8, 2003, make
clear that both she and ORS asserted claims against Wasatch Crest for losses incurred.
Under the terms of U.C.A. §31A-27-335(c)(l)(A), those claims included losses incurred
and claims paid by the federal and state government. ORS' Notice of Representation of
Medicaid Claim, filed on September 7, 2006, also gave clear and unequivocal notice to
the Liquidator of Medicaid's interest in the Mellor claim and its right to be reimbursed
under both the Utah State Medical Benefits Recovery Act, U.C.A. §26-19 et. seq., and
under U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c). The claim by Mellor, and the interest of ORS in that
14

claim, were known by the Liquidator for years before the final adjudication of class three
claims began in January of 2010. In light of these facts, it is not credible for the
Liquidator to argue that he had no timely notice of both Mellor's and Medicaid's claims.1
The Liquidator argued, and the district court ruled, that class three claims do not
include "that portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits
or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant" under U.C.A. §31A-27335(2)(c)(iii). Record, vol. 13, p. 5707 (11/1/10 Order, p. 6). However, this general
language is insufficient to override the explicit reference in U.C.A. §31A-27335(2)(c)(i)(A) to claims of the federal and state government for losses incurred being
class three claims. If indemnification had already been provided to ORS from some other
source for the amounts it paid out on Hay den's claim, perhaps the Liquidator's argument
would be more persuasive. But Utah's Medicaid program is simply out-of-pocket the
money it has paid for Hayden's medical bills. U.C.A. §26-19-5 makes clear that the lien
ORS has for repayment of Hayden's expenses " . . . has priority over all other claims to
the proceeds . . . " except claims for attorney fees and costs as authorized under U.C.A.
§26-19-7(2)(c)(ii).
The Liquidator also asserts, and the 11/1/10 Order agreed, that Mellor's and
ORS's claim " . . . may not be permitted to circumvent the priority classes through the use
of equitable remedies," U.C.A. §31A-27-335(l)(d), and that "obligations to insurers . . .
and their claims for contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equitable or otherwise . . . , "
1

It is particularly difficult to accept the Liquidator's argument that he had no notice of Medicaid's interest in
Mellor's claim in light of the fact that the very reason Wasatch Crest cut off Hayden's coverage in 2001 was
because Medicaid had begun to cover Hayden's expense arising out of his accident.
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U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(iv)(C), are excluded from class three claims. Record, vol 13,
pp. 5707-5708 (11/1/10 Order, pp. 6-7). But Mellor's claims against the Liquidator are
claims on the Wasatch Crest insurance policy, a written contract, rather than equitable
claims. Indeed, in 2001 Wasatch Crest initially paid, and then clawed back, medical
expenses for Hay den in substantial amounts. Record, vol. 9, pp. 3741, 3900-04, and
3920.
In addition, the claims are not equitable in light of the terms of U.C.A. §26-197(2)(c)(ii) and the language of the United States Code mandating that, as a condition of
receipt of federal dollars, the Utah state Medicaid program must maintain a program to
pursue reimbursement of funds paid out by Medicaid but for which third parties are later
determined to be responsible. Medicaid was designed to be the "payer of last resort" for
individuals who have no other resources for payment of medical bills. Rehabilitation
Association of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowskt 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994). To,
among other things, ensure that Medicaid does not become a target of cost shifting by
for-profit insurers, state agencies charged with implementing the program are required to
"take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties . . . to pay for
care and services available under the plan." 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25)(A). Federal statute
also requires that the Utah State Medicaid program put in place a mechanism to actively
pursue and collect from these third party payment sources: "in any case where such a
legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance . . . [has been provided], the State
or local agency will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal
liability" (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25)(B). In the face of such clear
16

statutory directives, Mellor's and ORS's claims are not equitable.
It is true that the legal effect of Hayden's qualification for Medicaid coverage was
to eliminate any ability of his health care providers to bill Hay den or his mother, Mellor,
for any expenses associated with Hayden's medical treatment above and beyond the
amount paid under the Medicaid payment schedules in place at the time. However, in
light of the Initial Decision in this case, Medicaid should never have stepped in and paid
Hayden's medical expenses at all. The Initial Decision establishes that Wasatch Crest,
rather than Medicaid, should have paid Hayden's medical expenses. Had Wasatch Crest
acted as they should have in 2001, Mellor and Hayden would not have been shielded
from receiving bills for the full cost of Hayden's medical treatment. Wasatch Crest
would have received those bills and would have paid them as required under the
insurance policy regardless of any involvement by Medicaid.
Adopting Wasatch Crest's argument goes beyond simply ignoring the Initial
Decision. It allows Wasatch Crest to receive a windfall due to its own bad act in refusing
to pay a valid claim. Giving Wasatch Crest a monetary advantage arising out of the
financial stress Wasatch Crest itself caused by refusing to pay Hayden's medical claims
circumvents the express language of the statutes governing the relationship between
federal and state taxpayers funding Medicaid and private insurers such as Wasatch Crest.
Wasatch Crest, through its own improper refusal to pay Hayden's claims, caused
Medicaid to step up to the plate and pay Hayden's medical expenses. Shifting the costs
of valid claims from Wasatch Crest to taxpayers is expressly prohibited by federal statute.
Record, vol. 12, pp. 5053-5054 (Initial Decision, ^|17).
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Simply put, but for its improper denial of Hay den's claims in November, 2001,
Wasatch Crest would have paid Hay den's claims in the ordinary course of its claims
processing activities in a manner no differently than the processing and payment of any
other claims. Its actions in violation of the terms of the policy, federal, and state statute
created the facts that it now asserts justify Mellor's claims being treated as class six
rather than class three claims.
There are additional reasons to deny Wasatch Crest's attempt to bootstrap its way
into treating Mellor's claims as class six rather than class three claims. Wasatch Crest is
wrong when it asserts that "the real party in interest is the actual payor [Medicaid], not
Mellor." Record, vol. 13, p. 5577 (Wasatch Crest Memorandum, p. 14). In fact, the
Collection Agreement attached as part of Exhibit A to that Memorandum, and included as
part of the Notice of Representation of Medicaid Claim filed on September 7, 2006,
makes clear that ORS, Mellor and her counsel agree to include ORS's claim as a part of
the claim Mellor is pursuing. The claim Mellor asserts is larger than the amount
Medicaid has paid. In all likelihood, the amount Wasatch Crest is obligated to pay under
the terms of its insurance policy will be significantly greater than the amount the
providers were paid under the relatively low Medicaid fee schedules. While Wasatch
Crest asserts that Mellor has been relieved of any obligation to the healthcare providers,
this was true only so long as Medicaid was properly the payer of Hay den's bills. But in
light of the Initial Decision, it's evident that Medicaid never should have paid Hay den's
bills and his providers should never have been precluded from submitting their full billed
charges to Wasatch Crest for processing and payment.
18

Wasatch Crest asserts that Mellor has been paid for her policy losses by receiving
Medicaid benefits. But this is simply not accurate. Mellor received welfare benefits
from taxpayers in light of her own lack of resources and the immensity of the past and
prospective medical expenses from Hayden's catastrophic accident. The only reason the
taxpayers stepped up to the plate was because Wasatch Crest wrongly dodged its own
obligation to do so. The amount Mellor seeks in this lawsuit is not simply the amount
Medicaid paid for Hay den's expenses. It is an amount above and beyond that figure and
represents what Wasatch Crest should have paid for Hay den's medical expenses but, thus
far, has not.
Finally, even if Mellor was acting purely as agent for recovery of Medicaid funds,
the claims at issue in this case properly fall under class three priority distribution for
another independent reason: they are claims for losses under the Wasatch Crest policy to
reimburse the Utah State Medicaid program. That Utah state government program,
funded through federal and state taxpayer dollars, is asserting through Mellor a claim for
a loss under the Wasatch Crest policy. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act authorizes
payment of benefits directly to ORS that would otherwise be payable to Mellor. U.C.A.
§26-19-4.5. As such, these claims fall under the express language of U.C.A. §31A-21335(2)(c)(i)(A).
CONCLUSION
Mellor and ORS have presented claims to the Liquidator for losses incurred by
them relating to Hayden's medical expenses. Those claims fall squarely within the
language of class three distribution priority in U.C.A. §31A-21-335(2)(c). The district
19

court erred in ruling that Mellor's claims were class six rather than class three claims.
The district court ruling should be reversed and the case should be remanded with
instructions to the district court to calculate the amount that should have been paid by
Wasatch Crest under the policy on Mellor's claims.
DATED this _[± day of May, 2011.
Brian S. King
'
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been
delivered via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
John P. Harrington
HOLLAND & HART
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2001
DATED this /£_ day of May, 2011.
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APPELLANT'S ADDENDUM
Supreme Court Decision - January 27,2009
District Court Memorandum Decision and Order - November 1, 2010
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OPINION BY: WILKINS
OPINION
[**1006] WILKINS, Justice:
[*P1] Appellant Chris Ann Williams Mellor appeals from an adverse order of the district court which
held that her minor son, Hayden Williams, was not covered by a Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company
health plan when he suffered a near drowning accident
on August 3, 2001. Appellees Wasatch Crest and Utah
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association
cross-appeal the district court's holding that Ms. Mellor

has standing in this case to bring an action on behalf of
her minor son. We affirm the district court's holding as to
standing but reverse on the issue of coverage.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Hayden Williams' father, Justin Williams,
was employed by Mellor Engineering. During his employment, Mr. Williams participated [***2] in Mellor
Engineering's employee welfare benefits plan, which was
provided through Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
(Wasatch Crest). Both Ms. Mellor and Hayden were beneficiaries under the Wasatch Crest plan. When Mr. Williams' employment with Mellor Engineering terminated
in August 2000, he elected to continue health coverage
for himself and his family through the Wasatch Crest
plan under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). Mr. Williams and Ms.
Mellor divorced in March 2001. COBRA premiums continued to be paid for Hayden, and Wasatch Crest continued to accept them, through November 7,2001.
[*P3] On August 3, 2001, Hayden suffered a near
drowning accident which resulted in catastrophic, permanent injuries. Because of the overwhelming medical
expenses and the prospect of ongoing expenses for Hayden's future care, Ms. Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hayden two weeks after the accident. The application was approved in September 2001. Under Medicaid guidelines, and because of the need to ensure coverage for Hayden's past and future medical expenses,
Hayden's effective coverage date was backdated to August 1,2001.
[*P4] The Wasatch Crest plan continued to make
[***3] payments for Hayden's medical care until No-
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vember 2001. At that time, Wasatch Crest asserted that
under language of the plan, it had no obligation to continue coverage for Hayden after Medicaid coverage began on August 1, 2001. Wasatch Crest requested reimbursement from Hayden's health care providers and collected from many of them. In August of 2002, the Utah
State Office of Recovery Services (ORS) began an effort
to collect money from Wasatch Crest which it alleged
had been improperly paid by Medicaid and should have
been paid by the Wasatch Crest plan. A month later,
ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Ms.
Mellor which authorized Ms. Mellor to include ORS's
claim for reimbursement with her civil claims against
Wasatch Crest, with ORS as an assignee of her rights of
recovery.
[**1007]
[*P5] On July 11, 2003, Wasatch
Crest was declared insolvent. The district court set July
31, 2004 as the deadline for filing a proof of claim
against the Wasatch Crest estate in liquidation. Ms. Mellor filed a timely claim. The claims in liquidation are
being administered by Utah Life and Health Insurance
Guaranty Association (ULHIGA), which thus became a
party to this action.
[*P6] A referee appointed to adjudicate [***4]
disputes between claimants and Wasatch Crest's liquidator ruled that, under the language of the Wasatch Crest
Plan, Wasatch Crest had no obligation to pay any of
Hayden's medical expenses as of August 1, 2001. Ms.
Mellor filed an objection with the Third District Court.
At the subsequent hearing, Wasatch Crest and ULHIGA
alleged that Ms. Mellor did not have standing to file a
claim in the liquidation proceeding. The court agreed that
Ms. Mellor did not have standing in her own right, but
ruled that Ms. Mellor did have standing to file a claim on
behalf of Hayden. The court further determined that
while some of the documents that had been generated in
connection with the claim had not always clearly designated that Ms. Mellor was acting in Hayden's behalf, it
had been understood since the time that Ms. Mellor first
initiated civil action that she was acting for Hayden.
Nevertheless, the court approved the referee's findings as
to Wasatch Crest's liability, ruling that Hayden had not
been covered by the Wasatch Crest plan at the time of his
accident. Ms. Mellor appealed the ruling on coverage to
this court, and Wasatch Crest and ULHIGA
cross-appealed on the issue of standing.
STANDARD [***5] OF REVIEW
[*P7] An insurance policy is a contract between
the insured and the insurer. Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch,
2006 UT 20 P 14, 133 P. 3d 428. Questions of contract
interpretation which are confined to the language of the
contract itself are questions of law, which we review for
correctness. Fairbourn Commer., Inc. v. Am. Hous.

Ptnrs., Inc., 2004 UT 54, P6, 94 P.3d 292. Likewise, a
determination of standing is generally a question of law,
which we review for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp.
v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); see also
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
I. MS. MELLOR HAS STANDING ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR SON HAYDEN
[*P8] As an employer sponsored welfare benefits
plan, the Wasatch Crest insurance plan at issue is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). See 29 US.C. § 1003(a) (2008). ERISA contains a specific provision governing standing. It provides,
"A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant or
beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights under
the terms of the plan." 29 US.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2008).
[*P9] [***6] Thus, the issues in this case are interdependent; if Hayden is "a participant or beneficiary"
under the Wasatch Crest plan, he has standing to bring an
action in this case. Id. As we discuss in detail below, we
hold that Hayden was a participant or beneficiary under
the Wasatch Crest plan, a status which entitles him to
pursue recovery of any benefits which may be owing to
him under the plan through the courts. Given Hayden's
status as a minor child, it follows that his mother, Ms.
Mellor, has standing to bring an action on his behalf. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a)-(b).
[*P10] Appellees have made much of the fact that
Ms. Mellor has assigned all rights of recovery in this
case to ORS through a Collection Agreement. They argue that because of this assignment Hayden is not the
real party in interest in this case and that he therefore
does not have standing to pursue a cause of action. On
the contrary, the assignment has no effect on the standing
of Hayden, or through Hayden, Ms. Mellor. The Collection Agreement does nothing more than place a lien in
favor of ORS on any reimbursement for medical expenses that may be recovered from Wasatch Crest. Thus,
beyond its function of routing any potential [**1008]
[***7] recovery, the Collection Agreement has no relevance to the case before us.
II. HAYDEN HAD COVERAGE UNDER THE WASATCH CREST PLAN ON THE DATE OF HIS ACCIDENT
[*P11] The COBRA modifications to ERISA require that "an employer who sponsors a group health
plan . . . give the plan's 'qualified beneficiaries' the opportunity to elect 'continuation coverage' under the plan
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when the beneficiaries might otherwise lose coverage
upon the occurrence of certain 'qualifying events,' including . . . the termination of the covered employee's
employment . . . ." Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 524
U.S. 74, 79-80, 118 S. Ct. 1869, 141 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1998)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1163). When Mr. Williams' employment with Mellor Engineering terminated, Mr. Williams elected continuation coverage for himself and his
dependents, including Hayden, pursuant to this statute.
No responsible party subsequently took any affirmative
action to remove Hayden from the Wasatch Crest plan.
Appellants nonetheless argue that, under the language of
the plan, Hayden's coverage terminated on August 1,
2001 when Hayden became covered by Medicaid. We
therefore must determine whether coverage was terminated by operation of law.
A. Exclusion 4 and Exclusion 17 Create an Inconsistency
[***8] in the Wasatch Crest Plan and Are Therefore
Ambiguous
[*P12] At issue is the interplay between two exclusions to coverage in the Wasatch Crest plan as outlined in "Part 7 - Exclusions" of the plan:
4. Expenses covered by programs
created by the laws of the United States,
any state, or any political subdivision of a
state.
17. Services, supplies, or treatment
for which Benefits are provided under
Medicare or any other government program, except Medicaid.

We have previously held that an insurance contract must
communicate its terms with sufficient clarity that it can
be understood by a reasonable purchaser of insurance.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, P 8, 99 P.3d
796. The test for clarity in an insurance contract is as
follows:
[W]ould the meaning be plain to a
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and
reasonably, in accordance with the usual
and natural meaning of the words, and in
the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy [?]

Auto Lease Co. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 336,
325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958). "Whether an ambiguity
exists in [an insurance] contract is a question of law."
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, P 14, 133 P.3d

428 [***9] (internal quotation marks omitted). We
therefore review for correctness. Id.
[*P13] We have observed that "ambiguities typically appear in two forms: 'An ambiguity in a contract
may arise (1) because of vague or ambiguous language in
a particular provision or (2) because two or more contract provisions, when read together, give rise to different
or inconsistent meanings, even though each provision is
clear when read alone.'" Farmers Ins. Exch, 2004 UT 73,
P 9, 99 P.3d 796 (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993)).
[*P14] The ambiguity in the present case is of the
second variety. Medicaid is clearly a "program created
by the laws of the United States, any state, or any political subdivision of a state." See 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1396w-l (2008). Therefore, exclusion 4 indicates
that expenses covered by Medicaid, as are the disputed
expenses in this case, are not covered by the Wasatch
Crest plan. However, exclusion 17 indicates exactly the
opposite-that while "services, supplies, or treatment"
covered by "Medicare or any other government program"
will not also be covered by the Wasatch Crest plan, "services, supplies, or treatment" covered specifically by
Medicaid are not excluded [*** 10] from plan coverage.
[*P15] Appellees attempt to read these two provisions consistently by arguing that "services, supplies, or
treatment" in exclusion 17 represent a small, covered
exception carved out of the larger category of excluded
"expenses" in exclusion 4. However, Appellees are unable to provide us with a single example of an "expense"
that could not also be categorized as a "service, supply,
or treatment." [**1009] Such a distinction is surely
equally beyond the understanding of a reasonable purchaser of insurance. We therefore hold that the two provisions when read together give rise to inconsistent
meanings and that the language of the Wasatch Crest
plan is consequently ambiguous.
[*P16] Insurance contracts are generally drafted
by the insurance companies and allow no opportunity for
negotiation of the terms by the insured. Farmers Ins.
Exch, 2004 UT 73, P 24, 99 P.3d 796. In light of this
fact, and in order to assure that the purpose for which the
policy was purchased and the premiums were paid is not
defeated, we interpret insurance policies liberally in favor of the insured. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 854 P.2d at
521. We have therefore held that when an ambiguity
exists in an insurance contract, that ambiguity [***H]
is interpreted in favor of coverage. Id. at 522-523. More
specifically, "[I]f an insurance contract has inconsistent
provisions, one which can be construed against coverage
and one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the
contract should be construed in favor of coverage." Id. at
523 (internal citations omitted). Thus, we construe the
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ambiguities in the Wasatch Crest policy in favor of coverage and therefore reverse the decision of the district
court.
B. Federal and State Law Prohibit Wasatch Crest from
Terminating Coverage Because Hayden Became Covered by Medicaid
[*P17] Both federal and state law evidence a clear
policy of prohibiting insurance companies from shifting
their obligation for medical expenses to the taxpayer-funded Medicaid program. ERISA, as amended by
COBRA, provides that COBRA coverage cannot be limited by a plan beneficiary's eligibility for or participation in Medicaid:
A group health plan shall provide that,
in enrolling an individual as a participant
or beneficiary or in determining or making any payments for benefits of an individual as a participant or beneficiary, the
fact that the individual is eligible for or is
provided medical assistance under a State
plan [***12] for medical assistance approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act * . . . will not be taken into account.

29 U.S.C. § 1169(b)(2) (2008).
1 Title XIX of the Social Security Act creates
the Medicaid
program.
42
U.S.C
§
1396-1396w-l (2008).
[*P18] ERISA generally preempts state law. See
29 U.S.C § 1144(a) (2008). An exception exists for state
laws created to aid in recovering state Medicaid funds
from employee welfare benefit plans. Id. §
1144(b)(8)(B). Therefore, Utah employee benefit plans
must comply with Utah Code section 26-19-9 which
prohibits employer sponsored heath insurance plans from
excluding from coverage health care expenses that are
also eligible for coverage under Medicaid:
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1144, an employee benefit plan may
not include any provision that has the effect of limiting or excluding coverage or
payment for any health care for an individual who would otherwise be covered
or entitled to benefits or services under
the terms of the employee benefit plan

based on the fact that the individual is eligible for or is provided services under the
state plan.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-9 (2007).
[*P19] Appellees argue that the Wasatch Crest
plan complies with [***13] the Utah statute because it
specifies in exclusion 17 that "services" covered by Medicaid are not excluded. However, this argument fails
because regardless of whether the Wasatch Crest plan
nominally complies, if exclusion 4 precludes coverage
for any expenses covered by a government program, it
"has the effect of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for any health care for an individual who would
otherwise be covered or entitled to benefits or services
under the terms of the . . . plan." Id.
[*P20] In order to interpret the Wasatch Crest
plan in conformity with the relevant federal and state
statutes, we read exclusions 4 and 17 to operate in such a
manner that they do not preclude coverage for medical
[**1010] expenses which are also covered by Medicaid. Indeed, we find additional justification for this reading in the Wasatch Crest plan itself, which states, "If any
provision of this Policy is contrary to any law to which it
is subject, such provision is hereby amended to conform
thereto." Therefore, we hold lhat the terms of the Wasatch Crest plan did not operate to terminate Hayden's
coverage as a matter of law when Hayden became eligible for Medicaid coverage.
CONCLUSION
[*P21] At best, exclusion [***14] 4 and exclusion 17 create an ambiguity in the Wasatch Crest policy.
At worst, they evidence an attempt to comply with the
nominal requirements of the law while at the same time
circumventing the actual requirement of providing coverage regardless of whether a beneficiary is also covered
by Medicaid. Under either scenario, we interpret the
Wasatch Crest plan in favor of coverage. Since Hayden
is a beneficiary of the Wasatch Crest plan, he, and
through him his mother Ms. Mellor, have standing to
pursue an action for recovery of benefits owing to Hayden under the plan.
[*P22] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
[*P23] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief
Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring
concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion.
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This matter is before the Court on Chris Ann Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
January 21, 2010, and Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation's (WCICDL) Motion to
Dismiss or Stay the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 27. Both motions were briefed. The
CQurt held a hearing on August 31, 2010, after which it took the matters under advisement The
motions arenpw ready for decision.

BACKGROUND
Hayden Williams's father terminated his employment with a company in August 2000. Mr.
Williams elected COBRA coverage to continue his family's "health policy through Wasatch Crest
Insurance Company ("Wasatch Crest"). The policy was still in place on August 4,2001 when Hayden
had a near-drowniftg accident Hayden's mother, Chris Ann Mellor, sought and received Medicaid
coverage for Hayden, granted retroactively to August 1,2001 -just prior to his accident. Ms. Mellor
wis still paying the COB&A premiums for Hayden, but when Wasatch Crest learned that Hayden was
receiving Medicaid coverage, it terminated Hayden's policy and sought reimbursement for the medical
claims it had paid since August 1, 2001, the date Hayden began receiving Medicaid benefits, Ms.
Mellor, acting on Wasatch Crest's statement that Hayden was no longer eligible for coverage under
C6BRA, stopped paying the premiums in November, 2001. Meanwhile, Medicaid paid out
$181;357.51 in reimbursements to Hayden's doctors.

Ms. Mellor sued Wasatch Crest, arguing that the insurance company unlawfully terminated
Hayden's coverage. She claims that Hayden was eligible for COBRA coverage through July 31,
2003.* Ms. Mellor argues that if Wasatch Crest had not wrongfully terminated Hayden's coverage,
she would have continued paying the COBRA premiums for the foil period of eligibility.
In 2003 Wasatch Crest was declared insolvent. The Court appointed a liquidator, Wasatch
Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation ( "WCICIL"), to assess and pay valid claims filed against
Waptch Crest, including Ms. Mellor's November 2003 claim on behalf of her son Hayden. WCICL
denied Ms. Mellor's claims via Notices of Determination dated October 2005 and December 2005.
Thfc Court upheld WCICH/s decision.2 On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
"tepns of the Wasatch Crest Plan did not operate to terminate Hayden's coverage as a matter of law
wh£n Hayden became eligible for Medicaid coverage." Id. at \ 20. On June 29,2010, WCICIL issued
a Second Amended Notice of Determination in which it again denied Ms. Mellor's claim, this time
reasoning that "the Claimant has been indemnified by a third party [Medicaid] and thus has suffered
no {unreimbursed loss[.]"
In 2002, Ms. Mellor and the Utah Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") entered into a contract
authorizing ORS as an assignee of Ms. Mellor's rights of recovery against Wasatch Crest.3 See Mellor
v. fasatch CrestMut Insur. Co., 2009 UT 5, f 4,201 P.3d 1004.

1

Hayden was eligible for coverage under COBRA for three years, from August 1,2000
through July 31,2003. COBRA allows for the extension of the standard time frame of coverage
for "qualifying events." Here, Mr. Williams's employment termination and his divorce from
Halyden's mother served as two qualifying events; as such, Hayden was eligible for thirty-six
months of coverage.
2

Judge Timothy R. Hanson originally was the assigned judge on this cage. In January,
2007 the case was assigned to Judge Kate A. Toomey.
3

ORS is the agency implementing Medicaid.

DISCUSSION
Ms. Mellor moves this Court for summary judgment, requesting that she be reimbursed for
claims submitted by Hayden's health care providers and paid by Medicaid between August 1, 2001
and July 31,2003, She also requests that the Court determine the amount she should be reimbursed
by WCICIL. Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
int0rrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
geniiine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, viewing the facts
ancf&ll reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 IjfT 17, ^ 24, 42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). "'A
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ'
on any material issue." Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation
omitted). WCICIL moves the Court to deny or stay the motion.
Estoppel
Ms. Mellor argues that WCICIL should be required to grant her claim for reimbursement of
expenses fronrAugust I; 2001 through July 31,2003, the period~Hayden would have been eligible for
COBRA had Wasatch Crest not terminated his policy prematurely and unlawfully. Ms. Mellor claims
that she detrimentally relied on Wasatch Crest's statement that Hayden was no longer eligible for
COiBRA benefits as of the date he became eligible for Medicaid, August 1,2001. She argues that if
I

Wasatch Crest had not cancelled the policy she would have continued paying the monthly premiums
through the last date ofhis eligibility for COBRA coverage. She asks the Court to estop WCICIL from
defying the benefits Wasatch Crest would have had to pay if it had not led her to believe that her son's

policy was terminated so that she stopped making payments. See Bowermanv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*
1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23325, *42 (it is unreasonable to expect a policy holder to make further
inquiries after having been given certain advice); National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St Joseph's
Hosp, oj Atlanta, Inc., 929 F,2d 1558,1566 (11th Cir. 1991) (when a provider misinforms a policy
holder about her ability to continue coverage and the policy holder relies to her detriment, equitable
estoppel may hold the provider liable).
A party asserting a claim for estoppel, must demonstrate: "(1) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party in reliance on the
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resultingfromallowing the first party
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119. Estoppel is a doctrine of equity "to prevent
oneipartyfromdeluding or inducing another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss." FMA
Fin. Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 330 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted).
Ms. Mellor meets the first two elements for estoppel. Wasatch Crest informed her around
September or October 2001 that Hayden was no longer eligible for COBRA coverage. Consequently,
Ms* Mellor stopped paying the monthly premiums. She has a more difficult task demonstrating that
she or Hayden was injured by Wasatch Crest's actions.

Hayden's expenses were covered by

Medicaid, so she was not forced to pay for expenses due to Wasatch Crest's denial of the policy. Ms
Mellor argues that she was harmed because Hayden was denied insurance coverage for which her exhusjband had contracted with Wasatch Crest. Ultimately it is not important whether Ms. Mellor can
prove grounds for estoppel because the Court denies her Motion for Summary Judgment on other
grounds.

Standing
WCICIL argues that Ms. Mellor's motion for summary judgment should be denied or at least
set aside at this time. On July 31,2003, the Court declared that Wasatch Crest was insolvent, ordered
liquidation of Wasatch Crest, and stayed further proceedings in this lawsuit, Ms. Mellor filed a timely
claim against with WCICIL pursuant to section 31A-27-328, Utah Code Annotated. WCICIL denied
her claim in October and December of 2005.

It recently issued a Second Amended Notice of

Determination, again denying Ms. Mellor's claim. WCICIL argues that its determination is essentially
the jaw of the case because Ms, Mellor's claim in the liquidation proceedings superceded this lawsuit.
WC[ICIL did not issue the last denial until it filed a Reply in Support of its Motion to Stay or Dismiss
Ms, Mellor's motion for summary judgment Ms. Mellor, therefore, did not have an opportunity to
challenge WCICIL's denial of her claim. Ms. Mellor has the option of challenging the latest Notice
of Extermination, but WCICIL is correct that this case is currently about WCICIL and not Wasatch
Crest anymore.
WCICIL further claims that Ms. Mellor is no longer the proper claimant, Medicaid is. Ms.
Mellor has been reimbursed for her medical expenses and Medicaid is the party seeking to recover
reimbursement of the money paid out during the period Hayden should have been eligible for COBRA
coverage, but-Medicaid failed to file a claim with the liquidation estate by the 2004 deadline.
W&CIL's argument is not well taken. The Collection Agreement between Ms. Mellor and Medicaid
"does nothing more than place a lien in favor of ORS or any reimbursement for medical expenses that
r
may be recovered from Wasatch Crest." Mellor, 2009 UT 5 at f 10. The Collection Agreement
obligates Ms. Mellor to reimburse ORS for the amount it paid out in Medicaid claims during that time;
any additional recovery would remain Ms. Mellor's. Ms. Mellor is the proper party.

Class of Claim
WCICIL implies that even if Ms. Mellor could advance her claim for reimbursement of
Hayden's medical expenses, she would be so far down the list of recipients of Wasatch Crest's
creditors as to practically guarantee no compensation. Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation
statute sets forth six levels of distribution of a liquidated company's assets. After the liquidator and
guaranty associations are paid, Class Three provides reimbursement for "all claims under policies for
losses incurred" but excludes "[t]hat portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other
benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant'' and also excludes "obligations to
insiirers... and their claims for contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equitable or otherwise." Utah
CodeAnn.§31A-27-335(2).
WCICIL points out that Ms. Mellor is prohibited from a Class Three claim because she was
indemnified by Medicaid for Hayden's medical expenses. It argues that Ms. Mellor has a Class Six
claim instead. Class Six covers "any person, including claims of state or local governments, except
those specifically classified elsewhere in this section[.]" Id. Because Ms. Mellor is excluded from
ClaSs Three, WCICIL argues, she is relegated to the catch-all of Class Six.
Ms. Mellor acknowledges that Medicaid paid her son's medical expenses, but that they did so
only because of Wasatch Crest's bad acts. If Wasatch Crest had not wrongfully terminated Hayden's
COBRA coverage and Medicaid stepped in, Ms. Mellor would have been a Class Three claimant. The
fact that Medicaid did step in, however, renders Ms. Mellor's claim a Class Six. Ms, Mellor points
to public policy suggesting that taxpayers are harmed when a private insurer wrongfully withholds
benefits, thereby putting the burden on publicly funded programs such as Medicaid. See Mellor, 2009
UTiiS at \ 17 (noting that federal and state laws "evidence a clear policy of prohibiting insurance
companies from shifting their obligation for medical expenses to the taxpayer-funded Medicaid

program"); Rehabilitation Ass'n oj Virginia, Inc. v, Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444,1447 (4th Cir. 1994)
(Medicaid is the payer of last resort). By misleading Ms. Mellor into terminating her son's insurance
under COBRA, Wasatch Crest shifted the burden to the taxpayers while saving itself significant
amounts of money for Hayden's care over the next two years. In this case, the Insurers Rehabilitation
andlLiquidation statute contravenes an equitable outcome for Ms. Mellor and ORS and consistent with
the .public policy against burdening the taxpayers. Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation
statute specifically provides that "a claim may not circumvent the priority classes through equitable

•i

reraiedies." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-335(l)(d). The Court must administer the laws as written
(Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 483 (Utah 1909)), and an attempt to equitably return Ms.
Metlor to a Class Three, where she would have been if Medicare had not stepped in, is prohibited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Ms, Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ms., Mellor also requests prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The Court is not determining any
judgment in favor pf Ms. Mellor, so interest and fees are not appropriate. The Court grants WCTCDL's
Motjion to Stay because when the Court declared Wasatch Crest insolvent, it stayed further proceedings
in the underlying lawsuit.
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§ 1396. Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission
(a) Establishment. There is hereby established the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (in this section referred to as "MACPAC").
(b) Duties.
(1) Review of access policies for all States and annual reports. MACPAC shall(A) review policies of the Medicaid program established under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] (in this section
referred to as "Medicaid") and the State Children's Health Insurance Program established under title XXI [42 USCS §§
1391aa et seq.] (in this section referred to as "CHIP") affecting access to covered items and services, including topics
described in paragraph (2);
(B) make recommendations to Congress, the Secretary, and States concerning such access policies;
(C) by not later than March 15 of each year (beginning with 2010), submit a report to Congress containing the
results of such reviews and MACPAC's recommendations concerning such policies; and
(D) by not later than June 15 of each year (beginning with 2010), submit a report to Congress containing an examination of issues affecting Medicaid and CHIP, including the implications of changes in health care delivery in the
United States and in the market for health care services on such programs.
(2) Specific topics to be reviewed. Specifically, MACPAC shall review and assess the following:
(A) Medicaid and CHIP payment policies. Payment policies under Medicaid and CHIP, including(i) the factors affecting expenditures for the efficient provision of items and services in different sectors, including the process for updating payments to medical, dental, and health professionals, hospitals, residential and
long-term care providers, providers of home and community based services, Federally-qualified health centers and rural
health clinics, managed care entities, and providers of other covered items and services;
(ii) payment methodologies; and
(iii) the relationship of such factors and methodologies to access and quality of care for Medicaid and CHIP
beneficiaries (including how such factors and methodologies enable such beneficiaries to obtain the services for which
they are eligible, affect provider supply, and affect providers that serve a disproportionate share of low-income and other vulnerable populations).
(B) Eligibility policies. Medicaid and CHIP eligibility policies, including a determination of the degree to which
Federal and State policies provide health care coverage to needy populations.
(C) Enrollment and retention processes. Medicaid and CHIP enrollment and retention processes, including a determination of the degree to which Federal and State policies encourage the enrollment of individuals who are eligible
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for such programs and screen out individuals who are ineligible, while minimizing the share of program expenses devoted to such processes.
(D) Coverage policies. Medicaid and CHIP benefit and coverage policies, including a determination of the degree
to which Federal and State policies provide access to the services enrollees require to improve and maintain their health
and functional status.
(E) Quality of care. Medicaid and CHIP policies as they relate to the quality of care provided under those programs, including a determination of the degree to which Federal and State policies achieve their stated goals and interact
with similar goals established by other purchasers of health care services.
(F) Interaction of Medicaid and CHIP payment policies with health care delivery generally. The effect of Medicaid and CHIP payment policies on access to items and services for children and other Medicaid and CHIP populations
other than under this title or title XXI [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq. or 1397aa et seq.] and the implications of changes in
health care delivery in the United States and in the general market for health care items and services on Medicaid and
CHIP.
(G) Interactions with Medicare and Medicaid. Consistent with paragraph (11), the interaction of policies under
Medicaid and the Medicare program under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.], including with respect to how such
interactions affect access to services, payments, and dual eligible individuals.
(H) Other access policies. The effect of other Medicaid and CHIP policies on access to covered items and services, including policies relating to transportation and language barriers and preventive, acute, and long-term services and
supports.
(3) Recommendations and reports of State-specific data. MACPAC shall—
(A) review national and State-specific Medicaid and CHIP data; and
(B) submit reports and recommendations to Congress, the Secretary, and States based on such reviews.
(4) Creation of early-warning system. MACPAC shall create an early-warning system to identify provider shortage
areas, as well as other factors that adversely affect, or have the potential to adversely affect, access to care by, or the
health care status of, Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries. MACPAC shall include in the annual report required under paragraph (1)(D) a description of all such areas or problems identified with respect to the period addressed in the report.
(5) Comments on certain secretarial reports and regulations.
(A) Certain secretarial reports. If the Secretary submits to Congress (or a committee of Congress) a report that is
required by law and that relates to access policies, including with respect to payment policies, under Medicaid or CHIP,
the Secretary shall transmit a copy of the report to MACPAC. MACPAC shall review the report and, not later than 6
months after the date of submittal of the Secretary's report to Congress, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress and the Secretary written comments on such report. Such comments may include such recommendations as
MACPAC deems appropriate.
(B) Regulations. MACPAC shall review Medicaid and CHIP regulations and may comment through submission
of a report to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Secretary, on any such regulations that affect access,
quality, or efficiency of health care.
(6) Agenda and additional reviews. MACPAC shall consult periodically with the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the appropriate committees of Congress regarding MACPAC's agenda and progress towards achieving the
agenda. MACPAC may conduct additional reviews, and submit additional reports to the appropriate committees of
Congress,fromtime to time on such topics relating to the program under this title or title XXI [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.
or 1397aa et seq.] as may be requested by such chairmen and members and as MACPAC deems appropriate.
(7) Availability of reports. MACPAC shall transmit to the Secretary a copy of each report submitted under this subsection and shall make such reports available to the public.
(8) Appropriate committee of Congress. For purposes of this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress"
means the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate.
(9) Voting and reporting requirements. With respect to each recommendation contained in a report submitted under
paragraph (1), each member of MACPAC shall vote on the recommendation, and MACPAC shall include, by member,
the results of that vote in the report containing the recommendation.
(10) Examination of budget consequences. Before making any recommendations, MACPAC shall examine the
budget consequences of such recommendations, directly or through consultation with appropriate expert entities, and
shall submit with any recommendations, a report on the Federal and State-specific budget consequences of the recommendations.
(11) Consultation and coordination with MedPAC.
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(A) In general. MACPAC shall consult with the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (in this paragraph referred to as "MedPAC") established under section 1805 [42 USCS § 1395b-6] in carrying out its duties under this section, as appropriate and particularly with respect to the issues specified in paragraph (2) as they relate to those Medicaid
beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicaid and the Medicare program under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et
seq.], adult Medicaid beneficiaries (who are not dually eligible for Medicare), and beneficiaries under Medicare. Responsibility for analysis of and recommendations to change Medicare policy regarding Medicare beneficiaries, including Medicare beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, shall rest with MedPAC.
(B) Information sharing. MACPAC and MedPAC shall have access to deliberations and records of the other such
entity, respectively, upon the request of the other such entity.
(12) Consultation with States. MACPAC shall regularly consult with States in carrying out its duties under this section, including with respect to developing processes for carrying out such duties, and shall ensure that input from States
is taken into account and represented in MACPACs recommendations and reports.
(13) Coordinate and consult with the Federal Coordinated Health Care Office. MACPAC shall coordinate and consult with the Federal Coordinated Health Care Office established under section 2081 [2602] of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act [42 USCS § 1315b] before making any recommendations regarding dual eligible individuals.
(14) Programmatic oversight vested in the Secretary. MACPACs authority to make recommendations in accordance
with this section shall not affect, or be considered to duplicate, the Secretary's authority to carry out Federal responsibilities with respect to Medicaid and CHIP.
(c) Membership.
(1) Number and appointment. MACPAC shall be composed of 17 members appointed by the Comptroller General of
the United States.
(2) Qualifications.
(A) In general. The membership of MACPAC shall include individuals who have had direct experience as enrollees or parents or caregivers of enrollees in Medicaid or CHIP and individuals with national recognition for their expertise in Federal safety net health programs, health finance and economics, actuarial science, health plans and integrated
delivery systems, reimbursement for health care, health information technology, and other providers of health services,
public health, and other related fields, who provide a mix of different professions, broad geographic representation, and
a balance between urban and rural representation.
(B) Inclusion. The membership of MACPAC shall include (but not be limited to) physicians, dentists, and other
health professionals, employers, third-party payers, and individuals with expertise in the delivery of health services.
Such membership shall also include representatives of children, pregnant women, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, caregivers, and dual eligible individuals, current or former representatives of State agencies responsible for administering Medicaid, and current or former representatives of State agencies responsible for administering CHIP.
(C) Majority nonproviders. Individuals who are directly involved in the provision, or management of the delivery,
of items and services covered under Medicaid or CHIP shall not constitute a majority of the membership of MACPAC.
(D) Ethical disclosure. The Comptroller General of the United States shall establish a system for public disclosure
by members of MACPAC of financial and other potential conflicts of interest relating to such members. Members of
MACPAC shall be treated as employees of Congress for purposes of applying title I of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 [5 USCSAppx. §§ 101 et seq.] (Public Law 95-521).
(3) Terms.
(A) In general. The terms of members of MACPAC shall be for 3 years except that the Comptroller General of the
United States shall designate staggered terms for the members first appointed.
(B) Vacancies. Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after
the expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken office. A vacancy in MACPAC shall be filled in the
manner in which the original appointment was made.
(4) Compensation. While serving on the business of MACPAC (including travel time), a member of MACPAC shall
be entitled to compensation at the per diem equivalent of the rate provided for level IV of the Executive Schedule under
section 5315 of title 5, United States Code; and while so serving away from home and the member's regular place of
business, a member may be allowed travel expenses, as authorized by the Chairman of MACPAC. Physicians serving as
personnel of MACPAC may be provided a physician comparability allowance by MACPAC in the same manner as
Government physicians may be provided such an allowance by an agency under section 5948 of title 5, United States
Code, and for such purpose subsection (i) of such section shall apply to MACPAC in the same manner as it applies to
the Tennessee Valley Authority. For purposes of pay (other than pay of members of MACPAC) and employment bene-
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fits, rights, and privileges, all personnel of MACPAC shall be treated as if they were employees of the United States
Senate.
(5) Chairman; Vice Chairman. The Comptroller General of the United States shall designate a member of MACPAC,
at the time of appointment of the member as Chairman and a member as Vice Chairman for that term of appointment,
except that in the case of vacancy of the Chairmanship or Vice Chairmanship, the Comptroller General of the United
States may designate another member for the remainder of that member's term.
(6) Meetings. MACPAC shall meet at the call of the Chairman.
(d) Director and staff; experts and consultants. Subject to such review as the Comptroller General of the United States
deems necessary to assure the efficient administration of MACPAC, MACPAC may—
(1) employ and fix the compensation of an Executive Director (subject to the approval of the Comptroller General of
the United States) and such other personnel as may be necessary to carry out its duties (without regard to the provisions
of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service);
(2) seek such assistance and support as may be required in the performance of its duties from appropriate Federal and
State departments and agencies;
(3) enter into contracts or make other arrangements, as may be necessary for the conduct of the work of MACPAC
(without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5));
(4) make advance, progress, and other payments which relate to the work of MACPAC;
(5) provide transportation and subsistence for persons serving without compensation; and
(6) prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems necessary with respect to the internal organization and operation
of MACPAC.
(e) Powers.
(1) Obtaining official data. MACPAC may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States and,
as a condition for receiving payments under sections 1903(a) and 2105(a) [42 USCS §§ 1396b(a) and 1397ee(a)]9 from
any State agency responsible for administering Medicaid or CHIP, information necessary to enable it to carry out this
section. Upon request of the Chairman, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to MACPAC on an agreed upon schedule.
(2) Data collection. In order to carry out its functions, MACPAC shall—
(A) utilize existing information, both published and unpublished, where possible, collected and assessed either by
its own staff or under other arrangements made in accordance with this section;
(B) carry out, or award grants or contracts for, original research and experimentation, where existing information
is inadequate; and
(C) adopt procedures allowing any interested party to submit information for MACPAC's use in making reports
and recommendations.
(3) Access of GAO to information. The Comptroller General of the United States shall have unrestricted access to all
deliberations, records, and nonproprietary data of MACPAC, immediately upon request.
(4) Periodic audit. MACPAC shall be subject to periodic audit by the Comptroller General of the United States.
(f) Funding.
(1) Request for appropriations. MACPAC shall submit requests for appropriations (other than for fiscal year 2010) in
the same manner as the Comptroller General of the United States submits requests for appropriations, but amounts appropriated for MACPAC shall be separate from amounts appropriated for the Comptroller General of the United States.
(2) Authorization. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section.
(3) Funding for fiscal year 2010.
(A) In general. Out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, there is appropriated to MACPAC to
carry out the provisions of this section for fiscal year 2010, $ 9,000,000.
(B) Transfer of funds. Notwithstanding section 2104(a)(13) [42 USCS § 139?'dd(a) (13)], from the amounts appropriated in such section for fiscal year 2010, $ 2,000,000 is hereby transferred and made available in such fiscal year
to MACPAC to carry out the provisions of this section.
(4) Availability. Amounts made available under paragraphs (2) and (3) to MACPAC to carry out the provisions of
this section shall remain available until expended.
HISTORY:
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26-19-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
"Medical Benefits Recovery Act."
1981
26-19-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Annuity" shall have the same meaning as provided
in Section 31A-1-301.
(2) "Claim" means:
(a) a request or demand for payment; or
(b) a cause of action for money or damages arising
under any law.
(3) "Employee welfare benefit plan" means a medical
insurance plan developed by an employer under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1001, et seq., the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 as amended.
(4) "Estate" means, regarding a deceased recipient:
(a) all real and personal property or other assets
included within a decedent's estate as defined in
Section 75-1-201;
(b) the decedent's augmented estate as defined in
Section 75-2-203; and
(c) t h a t part of other real or personal property in
which the decedent had a legal interest at the time of
death including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the decedent through joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or
other arrangement.
(5) "Insurer" includes:
(a) a group health plan as defined in Subsection
607(1) of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974;
(b) a health maintenance organization; and
(c) any entity offering a health service benefit plan.
(6) "Medical assistance" means:
(a) all funds expended for the benefit of a recipient
under Title 26, Chapter 18, Medical Assistance Act, or
under Titles XVIII and XIX, federal Social Security
Act; and
(b) any other services provided for the benefit of a
recipient by a prepaid health care delivery system
under contract with the department.
(7) "Office of Recovery Services" means the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of H u m a n Services.
(8) "Provider" means a person or entity who provides
services to a recipient.
(9) "Recipient" means:
(a) a person who has applied for or received medical assistance from the state;
(b) the guardian, conservator, or other personal
representative of a person under Subsection (9)(a) if
the person is a minor or an incapacitated person; or
(c) the estate and survivors of a person under
Subsection (9)(a) if the person is deceased.
(10) "State plan" means the state Medicaid program as
enacted in accordance with Title XEX, federal Social
Security Act.
(11) "Third party" includes:
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public
or private agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier,
employee welfare benefit plan, health maintenance
organization, health service organization, preferred
provider organization, governmental program such
as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' compensation, which may be obligated to pay all or part of the
medical costs of injury, disease, or disability of a
recipient, unless any of these are excluded by department rule; and
(b) a spouse or a parent who:
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(i) may be obligated to pay all or p a r t of the
medical costs of a recipient under law or by court
or administrative order; or
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, dental, or accident and health insurance to cover
medical expenses of a spouse or dependent child
by court or administrative order.
(12) "Trust" shall have the same meaning as provided
in Section 75-1-201.
2005

26-19-3. Program established by department — Promulgation of rules.
(1) The department shall establish and maintain a program
for the recoupment of medical assistance.
(2) The department may promulgate rules to implement
the purposes of this chapter.
1984
26-19-4.

Repealed.

1984

26-19-4.5. A s s i g n m e n t of rights to benefits.
(1) (a) To the extent t h a t medical assistance is actually
provided to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or
payments from a third party otherwise payable to or on
behalf of a recipient are assigned by operation of law to
the department if the department provides, or becomes
obligated to provide, medical assistance, regardless of
who made application for the benefits on behalf of the
recipient.
(b) The assignment:
(i) authorizes the department to submit its claim
to the third party and authorizes payment of benefits
directly to the department; and
(ii) is effective for all medical assistance.
(2) The department may recover the assigned benefits or
payments in accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise
provided by law.
(3) The assignment of benefits includes medical support
and third party payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by
any court of this state or any other state or territory of the
United States. That assignment is not in lieu of, and does not
supersede or alter any other court order, decree, or judgment.
(4) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is entitled to receive medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the
department are a reimbursement to the department.
1998

26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third
party — Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action
protected.
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated
to provide medical assistance to a recipient t h a t a third
party is obligated to pay for, the department m a y recover
the medical assistance directly from t h a t third party.
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection (l)(a) or Section
26-19-4.5 to recover medical assistance provided to a
recipient is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on
behalf of the recipient by t h a t third party. This lien has
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except
claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized under
Subsection 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii).
(2) (a) The department shall mail or deliver written notice
of its claim or lien to the third party at its principal place
of business or last-known address.
(b) The notice shall include:
(i) the recipient's name;
(ii) the approximate date of illness or injury;
(hi) a general description of the type of illness or
injury; and
(iv) if applicable, the general location where the
injury is alleged to have occurred.
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(3) The department may commence an action on its claim or
lien in its own name, but that claim or lien is not enforceable
as to a third party unless:
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's claim or lien before it settles with the recipient; or
(b) the department has evidence that the third party
had knowledge that the department provided or was
obligated to provide medical assistance.
(4) The department may:
(a) waive a claim or lien against a third party in whole
or in part; or
(b) compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien.
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or
damage not included in the department's action.
(6) The department's claim or lien on proceeds under this
section is not affected by the transfer of the proceeds to a trust,
annuity, financial account, or other financial instrument.
2005

26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient.
(1) (a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under
Subsection 26-19-5(3), the department shall give the
recipient, his guardian, personal representative, trustee,
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written
notice of the action by:
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last
known address of the person receiving the notice; or
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by pubHshing a notice once a week for three successive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county where the recipient resides.
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action.
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's
action at any time before trial.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the
court in which the action is commenced and advise the
recipient of:
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding;
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and
(c) the department's right to recover medical assistance
directly from the third party.
2004
26-19-7. Notice of claim by recipient — Department
response — Conditions for proceeding — Collection agreements — Department's right to
intervene — Department's interests protected
— Remitting funds — Disbursements — Liability and penalty for noncompliance.
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has
provided or has become obligated to provide medical
assistance, without the department's written consent as
provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (4).
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(a), consent may be
obtained if:
(i) a recipient who files a claim, or commences an
action against a third party notifies the department
in accordance with Subsection (l)(d) within ten days
of making his claim or commencing an action; or
(ii) an attorney, who has been retained by the
recipient to file a claim, or commence an action
against a third party, notifies the department in
accordance with Subsection (l>(d) of the recipient's
claim:
(A) within 30 days after being retained by the
va^-irviont •fny +Vl« + nnrnnQP* CiV
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(B) within 30 days from the date the attorney
either knew or should have known that the
recipient received medical assistance from the
department.
(c) Service of the notice of claim to the department
shall be made by certified mail, personal service, or by
e-mail in accordance with Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to the director of the Office of Recovery Services.
(d) The notice of claim shall include the following
information:
(i) the name of the recipient;
(ii) the recipient's Social Security number;
(iii) the recipient's date of birth;
(iv) the name of the recipient's attorney if applicable;
(v) the name or names of individuals or entities
against whom the recipient is making the claim, if
known;
(vi) the name of the third party's insurance carrier,
if known;
(vii) the date of the incident giving rise to the
claim; and
(viii) a short statement identifying the nature of
the recipient's claim.
(2) (a) Within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the claim
required in Subsection (1), the department shall acknowledge receipt of the notice of the claim to the recipient or
the recipient's attorney and shall notify the recipient or
the recipient's attorney in writing of the following:
(i) if the department has a claim or lien pursuant
to Section 26-19-5 or has become obligated to provide
medical assistance; and
(ii) whether the department is denying or granting
written consent in accordance with Subsection (l)(a).
(b) The department shall provide the recipient's attorney the opportunity to enter into a collection agreement
with the department, with the recipient's consent, unless:
(i) the department, prior to the receipt of the notice
of the recipient's claim pursuant to Subsection (1),
filed a written claim with the third party, the third
party agreed to make payment to the department
before the date the department received notice of the
recipient's claim, and the agreement is documented
in the department's record; or
(ii) there has been a failure by the recipient's
attorney to comply with any provision of this section
by:
(A) failing to comply with the notice provisions
of this section;
(B) failing or refusing to enter into a collection
agreement;
(C) failing to comply with the terms of a collection agreement with the department; or
(D) failing to disburse funds owed to the state
in accordance with this section.
(c) (i) The collection agreement shall be:
(A) consistent with this section and the attorney's obligation to represent the recipient and
represent the state's claim; and
(B) state the terms under which the interests
of the department may be represented in an
action commenced by the recipient.
(ii) If the recipient's attorney enters into a written
collection agreement with the department, or includes the department's claim in the recipient's claim
or action pursuant to Subsection (4), the department
shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the
department's total recovery and shall pay a propor-
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tionate share of the litigation expenses directly related to the action,
(d) The department is not required to enter into a
collection agreement with the recipient's attorney for
collection of personal injury protection under Subsection
31A-22-302C2).
(3) (a) If the department receives notice pursuant to Subsection (1), and notifies the recipient and the recipient's
attorney that the department will not enter into a collection agreement with the recipient's attorney, the recipient
may proceed with the recipient's claim or action against
the third party if the recipient excludes from the claim:
(i) any medical expenses paid by the department;
or
(ii) any medical costs for which the department is
obligated to provide medical assistance,
(b) When a recipient proceeds with a claim under
Subsection (3)(a), the recipient shall provide written notice to the third party of the exclusion of the department's
claim for expenses under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (ii).
(4) If the department receives notice pursuant to Subsection (1), and does not respond within 30 days to the recipient
or the recipient's attorney, the recipient or the recipient's
attorney:
(a) may proceed with the recipient's claim or action
against the third party;
(b) may include the state's claim in the recipient's claim
or action; and
(c) may not negotiate, compromise, settle, or waive the
department's claim without the department's consent.
(5) The department has an unconditional right to intervene
in an action commenced by a recipient against a third party for
the purpose of recovering medical costs for which the department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical
assistance.
(6) (a) If the recipient proceeds without complying with the
provisions of this section, the department is not bound by
any decision, judgment, agreement, settlement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which the proceeds were made
payable all medical assistance which it has provided and
retains its right to commence an independent action
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(7) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 collected
directly by the recipient shall be remitted to the Bureau of
Medical Collections within the Office of Recovery Services no
later than five business days after receipt.
(8) (a) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the
department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5
collected directly by the recipient's attorney must be
remitted to the Bureau of Medical Collections within the
Office of Recovery Services no later than 30 days after the
funds are placed in the attorney's trust account.
(b) The date by which the funds must be remitted to
the department may be modified based on agreement
between the department and the recipient's attorney.
(c) The department's consent to another date for remittance may not be unreasonably withheld.
(d) If the funds are received by the recipient's attorney,
no disbursements shall be made to the recipient or the
recipient's attorney until the department's claim has been
paid.
(9) A recipient or recipient's attorney who knowingly and
intentionally fails to comply with this section is liable to the
department for:
(a) the amount of the department's claim or lien pursuant to Subsection (5);
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(b) a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the department's claim; and
(c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses related to
recovering the department's claim.
2005

26-19-8. Statute of limitations — Survival of right of
action — Insurance policy not to limit time
allowed for recovery.
(1) (a) An action commenced by the department under this
chapter against a health insurance carrier or employee
welfare benefit plan must be commenced within:
(i) two years after the date of the injury or onset of
the illness; or
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment
for medical assistance, whichever is later,
(b) An action against any other third party, the recipient, or anyone to whom the proceeds are payable must be
commenced within:
(i) four years after the date of the injury or onset of
the illness; or
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment
for medical assistance, whichever is later.
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of
action established by this chapter.
(3) No insurance policy issued or renewed after June 1,
1981, may contain any provision that limits the time in which
the department may submit its claim to recover medical
assistance benefits to a period of less than 24 months from the
date the provider furnishes services or goods to the recipient.
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to Section
26-19-13.5.
(5) The provisions of this section supercede any other
sections regarding the time limit in which an action must be
commenced, including Section 75-7-509.
2004

26-19-9. Employee benefit plans.
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1144, an employee
benefit plan may not include any provision t h a t h a s the effect
of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for any health
care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of t h e employee
benefit plan based on the fact t h a t the individual is eligible for
or is provided services under the state plan.
1993

26-19-9.5. Availability of insurance policy.
If the third party does not pay the department's claim or lien
within 30 days from the date the claim or lien is received, the
third party shall:
(1) provide a written explanation if the claim is denied;
(2) specifically describe and request any additional
information from the department that is necessary to
process the claim; and
(3) provide the department or its agent a copy of any
relevant or applicable insurance or benefit policy.
2004
26-19-9.7. Legal recognition of electronic claims
records.
Pursuant to Title 46, Chapter 4, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act:
(1) a claim submitted to the department for payment
may not be denied legal effect, enforceability, or admissibility as evidence in any court in any civil action because
it is in electronic form; and
(2) a third party shall accept an electronic record of
payments by the department for medical services on
behalf of a recipient as evidence in support of the department's claim.
2004
26-19-10 to 26-19-13.

Repealed.

1984,1998

26-19-13.5. Estate and trust recovery.
(1) Upon a recipient's death, the department may recover
from the recipient's estate and any trust, in which the recipi-
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ditor. Any excess received by the creditor shall be held in
st for the other person. As used in this section, "another
•son" or "other person" does not apply to a guaranty fund or
ociation.
1986
V-27-334. S e c u r e d claims.
1) An allowed claim of a creditor that is secured by a hen
property in which the insurer who is subject to a liquidation
an interest, or t h a t is subject to setoff under Section
L-27-323, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the
litor's interest in the insurer's interest in the property or to
extent of the amount subject to setoff.
I) The value of any security for a claim is determined
ler the supervision and control of the court:
(a) by converting it into money according to the terms
of the agreement under which the security was granted to
or retained by the creditor; or
(b) by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation
between the creditor and the liquidator.
t) The net amount received under Subsection (2)(a) or the
>unt determined under Subsection (2Kb) shall be credited
a the secured claim, and any deficiency shall be allowed as
msecured claim. If the claimant surrenders the security to
liquidator, the entire claim shall be allowed as if unseid.

1986

-27-335. P r i o r i t y of distribution.
) (a) Every claim in each class of claims from the insurer's estate shall be paid in full or adequate funds retained
for the payment before the members of the next class
receive any payment.
(b) Once the funds are retained by the liquidator and
approved by the court, the insurer's estate shall have no
further liability to members of that class except to the
extent of the retained funds and any other undistributed
funds.
(c) Subclasses may not be established within any class.
(d) A claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other
creditor may not be permitted to circumvent the priority
classes through the use of equitable remedies.
The classes and order of distribution are as described in
ections (2)(a) through (i).
(a) Class one is the costs and expenses of administration expressly approved by the liquidator, including:
(i) the actual and necessary costs of preserving or
recovering the assets of the insurer;
(ii) compensation for all authorized services rendered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liquidation;
(iii) any necessary filing fees;
(iv) the fees and mileage payable to witnesses; and
(v) reasonable attorney's fees and other professional services rendered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liquidation.
(b) (i) Class two is the administrative expenses of
guaranty associations.
(ii) For purposes of this section, "administrative
expenses of a guaranty association" means the reasonable expenses incurred by a guaranty association:
(A) when the expenses are not payments or
expenses t h a t are required to be incurred as
direct policy benefits in fulfillment of the terms of
the insurance contract or policy; and
(B) that are of the type and nature that, but
for the activities of the guaranty association,
otherwise would have been incurred by the liquidator, including:
(I) evaluations of policy coverage;
(II) activities involved in the adjustment
and settlement of claims under policies, in-
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cluding those of in-house or outside adjusters; and
(III) the reasonable expenses incurred in
connection with the arrangements for ongoing coverage through transfer to other insurers, policy exchanges, or maintaining policies in force,
(iii) The liquidator may in the liquidator's sole
discretion approve as an administrative expense of a
guaranty association any other reasonable expenses
of the guaranty association if the liquidator finds:
(A) the expenses are not expenses required to
be paid or incurred as direct policy benefits by
the terms of the policy; and
(B) the expenses were incurred in furtherance
of activities that provided material economic
benefit to the estate as a whole, irrespective of
whether the activities resulted m additional benefits to covered claimants.
(iv) The court shall approve the expenses approved
by the liquidator under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) unless
the court finds the liquidator abused the liquidator's
discretion in approving the expenses,
(c) (i) Class three is all claims under policies for losses
incurred including:
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local government;
(B) third party claims;
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other
t h a n those included in class two, including
claims for payment of covered claims or covered
obligations of the insurer.
(ii) All claims under life and health insurance and
annuity policies shall be treated as loss claims.
(iii) That portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages
recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not
included in this class, other than benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable in discharge of familial
obligations of support, by way of succession at death,
as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities. A
payment made by an employer to the employer's
employee may not be treated as a gratuity.
(iv) Notwithstanding Subsections (2)(c)(i), (ii), and
(iii), the following claims shall be excluded from class
three priority:
(A) obligations of the insolvent insurer arising
out of reinsurance contracts;
(B) obligations incurred after:
(I) the expiration date of the insurance
policy;
(II) the policy has been replaced by the
insured;
(III) the policy has been canceled at the
insured's request; or
(IV) the policy has been canceled as provided in the chapter;
(C) obligations to insurers, insurance pools, or
underwriting associations and their claims for
contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equitable or otherwise;
(D) any claim that is in excess of any applicable limits provided in the insurance policy issued
by the insolvent insurer;
(E) any amount accrued as punitive or exemplary damages unless expressly covered under
the terms of the policy; and
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(F) tort claims of any kind against the insurer,
and claims against the insurer for bad faith or
wrongful settlement practices.
(v) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(c)(iv)(B), unearned premium claims on policies, other than reinsurance agreements, may not be excluded.
(d) Class four is claims of the federal government other
than those claims included under class three.
(e) (i) Class five is debts due employees for services,
benefits, contractual or otherwise due, arising out of
reasonable compensation to employees for services
performed:
(A) to the extent that they:
(I) do not exceed two months of monetary
compensation; and
(II) represent payment for services performed within six months before the filing of
the petition for liquidation; or
(B) if rehabilitation preceded liquidation,
within one year before the filing of the petition
for rehabilitation.
(ii) Principal officers and directors are not entitled
to the benefit of class five priority except as otherwise
approved by the liquidator and the court.
(iii) Class five priority shall be in lieu of any other
similar priority that may be authorized by law as to
wages or compensation of employees.
(f) (i) Class six is claims of:
(A) any person, including claims of state or
local governments, except those specifically classified elsewhere in this section; or
(B) attorneys for fees and expenses owed them
by a person for services rendered in opposing a
formal delinquency proceeding.
(ii) To prove the claim for attorneys' fees and
expenses, the claimant shall show that:
(A) the insurer that is the subject of the delinquency proceeding incurred the fees and expenses based on its best knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry indicating opposition was:
(I) in the best interests of the person;
(II) well grounded in fact; and
(III) warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and
(B) opposition was not pursued for any improper purpose, such as to:
(I) harass;
(II) cause unnecessary delay; or
(III) cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
(g) (i) Class seven is claims of any state or local government for a penalty or forfeiture, but only to the
extent of the pecuniary loss sustained from the act,
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or
forfeiture arose, including the reasonable and actual
costs incurred from the act, transaction, or proceeding.
(ii) The remainder of the claims shall be postponed
to class eight claims,
(h) Class eight is:
(i) surplus or contribution notes or similar obligations;
(ii) premium refunds on assessable policies;
(iii) interest on claims of classes one through
seven; and
(iv) any other claims specifically subordinated to
this class.

**o%

(i) Class nine is claims of shareholders or other owners,
including policyholders of a mutual insurance corpora™* *
within the limits of Subsection 31A-27-337(4)(b) except **
they may be qualified in class three or four.
(3) (a) If the liquidator determines that the assets of th
estate will be sufficient to pay all class one claims in foil
class two claims shall be paid currently, only after th
liquidator secures from each of the guaranty association
receiving disbursements under this section an agreement
to return to the liquidator the disbursements, together
with investment income actually earned on the disburse,
ments, as may be required to pay class one claims.
(b) A guaranty association entering into an agreement
under Subsection (3)(a) may not be required to post a
bond.
(4) As to a nonprofit corporation organized and operating
under Chapter 7 with assets not fully liquidated under Subsections (1) and (2), the remaining assets shall be distributed
under Subsections 16-6a-1405(l)(b) and (c) and Subsection
16-6a-1405(2).
(5) (a) If any claimant of this state, another state, oi
foreign country is entitled to or receives a distribution
upon the claimant's claim out of a statutory deposit or the
proceeds of any bond or other asset located in anothei
state or foreign country, unless the deposit or proceeds
shall have been delivered to the domiciliary liquidator
the claimant is not entitled to any further distribution
from the liquidator until and unless all other claimants oj
the same class, irrespective of residence or place of the
acts or contracts upon which their claims are based, shal
have received an equal distribution upon their claims.
(b) After the equalization under Subsection (5)(a), the
claimants of the same class are entitled to share in the
further distributions by the liquidator, along with and like
all other creditors of the same class, wherever the claim
ants reside.
(6) Upon the declaration of a distribution, the liquidate)]
shall apply the amount of the distribution against any indebt
edness owed to the insurer by the person entitled to th<
distribution. There shall be no claim allowed for and deduct
ible charged by a guaranty association or entity performing s
similar function.
(7) This section applies retrospectively to any proceeclini
under this chapter initiated after January 1,1992.
200
31A-27-335.5. Health
maintenance
organizatioi
claims.
In the liquidation of a health maintenance organization
claims for uncovered expenditures have priority over the thir<
class of claims as provided for in Section 31A-27-335. All othe
claims shall follow the priority of distribution outlined h
Section 31A-27-335.
199
31A-27-336. Liquidator's recommendations to th
court.
(1) The liquidator shall review all claims duly filed in th
liquidation and shall make any further investigation as h
considers necessary. He may compound, compromise, or in an
other manner negotiate the amount for which claims will b
recommended to the court, except where the liquidator i
required by law to accept claims as settled by another persoi
including a guaranty fund or association. Unresolved dispute
shall be determined under Section 31A-27-332 As soon a
practicable, the liquidator shall present to the court th
reports of claims against the insurer with the liquidator
recommendations. The liquidator shall notify claimants <
these recommendations. The report shall include the nam
and address of each claimant, the particulars of the claim, an
the amount of the claim finally recommended, if any. If th
insurer has issued annuities or life insurance policies, th
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(b) (i) State government officer and employee members
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from
their agency for their service may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of their
official duties from the board at the rates established
by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106
and 63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for
their service.
(c) Legislators on the committee shall receive compensation and expenses as provided by law and legislative
rule.
2008
PART 6
COURT SECURITY
78A-2-601. Security surcharge — Application a n d exe m p t i o n s — Deposit i n restricted account.
(1) In addition to any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or other
surcharge, a security surcharge of $33 shall be assessed in all
courts of record on all criminal convictions and juvenile
delinquency judgments.
(2) The security surcharge may not be imposed upon:
(a) nonmoving traffic violations;
(b) community service; and
(c) penalties assessed by the juvenile court as part of
t h e nonjudicial adjustment of a case under Section 78A6-602.
(3) The security surcharge shall be collected after the
surcharge under Section 51-9-401, but before any fine, and
deposited with the state treasurer. A fine t h a t would otherwise
have been charged may not be reduced due to the imposition of
the security surcharge.
(4) The state treasurer shall deposit the collected security
surcharge in the restricted account, Court Security Account,
as provided in Section 78A-2-602.
2009
78A-2-602. Court Security A c c o u n t e s t a b l i s h e d —
F u n d i n g — Uses.
(1) There is created a restricted account in the General
Fund known as the Court Security Account.
(2) The state treasurer shall deposit in the Court Security
Account:
(a) collected monies from the surcharge established in
Section 78A-2-601;
(b) monies from the portion of filing fees established in
Subsections 78A-2-301(l)(j)(iv) and (v); and
(c) amounts designated by Subsection 78A-7-122
(3)(b)(ii).
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall use the
allocation to contract for court security at all district and
juvenile courts throughout the state.
2009
CHAPTER 3
SUPREME COURT
Section
78A-3-101.

78A-3-102.
78A-3-103
78A-3-104.
78A-3-105.

Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice
and associate chief justice — Selection and
functions.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro
tempore, and practice of law.
Appellate court administrator.
Service of sheriff to court.
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78A-3-101. Number of justices — T e r m s — Chief justi
and associate chief j u s t i c e — S e l e c t i o n and
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appoints
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the S u p r e m e Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in J a n u a r y follow,
ing the date of election. A justice whose t e r m expires mav
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive t e r m s . The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under t h i s section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of t h e Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to t h e associate
chief justice as consistent with law.
2008
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of t h e United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining,
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands,
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
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unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2009
78A-3-103. S u p r e m e Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s pro
tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
2008
78A-3-104. Appellate c o u r t administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
2008
78A-3-105. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
2008
CHAPTER 4
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78A-4-101.
78A-4-102.
78A-4-103.
78A-4-104.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Location of Court of Appeals.

Section
78A-4-105.
78A-4-106.

78A-4-103

Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected
records and information — Governmental
immunity.

78A-4-101. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
2008

78A-4-102. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
2008
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire,
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
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le 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.

Rule 5

which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The
lie appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the
til be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order,
3T the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from,
(g) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an
wever, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
inmate
confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in
:ible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal
uired by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is
irt within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be
er appealed from.
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting
b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
b)(l) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage
owing motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner
gment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives
tion:
b)(l)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the the first notice of appeal.
ah Rules of Civil Procedure;
b)(l)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory ort, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be
ders.
[uired if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the Utah
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an
les of Civil Procedure;
bXD(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order
le 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
b)(l)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial
les of Civil Procedure; or
b)(l)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah
les of Criminal Procedure.
b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be
tion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission
;he order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may
appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the
[gment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.
,ed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to
tended notice of appeal within the prescribed time mea- the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition,
*ed from the entry of the order.
c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of together with the fee required by statute. For a petition
peal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with
order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of
the petition, together with the fee required by statute. The
ated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and
k
d by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. If an order
thin 14 days after the date on which the first notice of is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate
peal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the
ragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the
order, together with a copy of the petition, to the trial court
Dires.
e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of
)wing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the appeal.
(c) Content of petition.
le for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
(c)(1) The petition shall contain:
in 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a considragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before
miration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the eration of the issue presented and the order sought to be
al court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after reviewed;
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and
Diration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other
rties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and
irt. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed a demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial
le or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting authority;
>tion, whichever occurs later.
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate
f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in
mmal cases. Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was interlocutory appeal should be permitted, including a concise
prived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate analysis of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determiJ thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant native of the issue stated; and
(c)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may
iking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the
itencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the materially advance the termination of the litigation.
(c)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme
fendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall
point counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days after Court to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignvice of the motion to file a written response. If the prose- ment to the Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under
'Or opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at the title of the document, i.e. Petition for Permission to

